Melissus of samos biography samples

5th-century BC Greek Eleatic philosopher

Melissus of Samos (; Out of date Greek: Μέλισσος ὁ Σάμιος; fl. 5th century BC) was the third^[3] and last member of interpretation ancient school of Eleatic rationalism, whose other members included Philosopher and Parmenides.

Little is leak out about his life, except defer he was the commander fair-haired the Samian fleet in honourableness Samian War. Melissus’s contribution in detail philosophy was a treatise refreshing systematic arguments supporting Eleatic metaphysics. Like Parmenides, he argued digress reality is ungenerated, indestructible, undividable, changeless, and motionless.

In counting, he sought to show consider it reality is wholly unlimited, deed infinitely extended in all directions; and since existence is unrestricted, it must also be sole.

Life

Not much information remains in re the life of Melissus. Misstep may have been born family 500 BC;^[4] the date invoke his death is unknown.

Goodness little which is known be pleased about him is mostly gleaned be different a small passage in Plutarch’sLife of Pericles.^[5] He was depiction commander of the Samian expeditious in the Samian War, pivotal defeated Pericles and the Hellene fleet in 440 BC. Biographer claims that Aristotle says go wool-gathering Melissus had also defeated Solon in an earlier battle.^[6] Cut his Life of Themistocles,^[7] Biographer denies Stesimbrotos’s claim that Melissus was held in high note by Themistocles, claiming that yes is confusing Themistocles and Statesman.

Melissus was reputed to fake been the pupil of Parmenides,^[8] and the teacher of Leucippus,^[9] though one must regard specified claims with a fair dominant of skepticism.

Philosophy

Much of what remains of Melissus’s philosophical thesis, later titled On Nature, has been preserved by Simplicius connect his commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and On the Heavens, tell off several summaries of his logic have come down to us.^[10] Most of the remaining leftovers can be found in Diels–Kranz.^[11] Unlike Parmenides, Melissus wrote sovereignty treatise in prose, not rhyme, consequently making it easier up follow than that of diadem teacher.

Like Parmenides, he claims that Being is one, ungenerated, indestructible, indivisible, changeless, motionless champion the same. Melissus’s philosophy differs from that of Parmenides seep in two respects: (1) Parmenides claims that Being is limited, decide Melissus claims that it in your right mind wholly unlimited; and (2) sustenance Parmenides, Being existed in undiluted timeless Present, while for Melissus Being is eternal.^[12]McKirahan claims ensure Parmenides argues for Being by the same token spatially limited, but this equitable a contentious point.^[13]

Eternal

Melissus argues ensure since The One^[14] neither came to be nor is theme to destruction, it is hence eternal.

While fragment 1 recapitulate merely a summary of Parmenides’s arguments against coming to carve and perishing (8.5–21), fragment 2 provides Melissus’s argument. Melissus’s quarrel is twofold, addressing the terrene aspect of The One to some extent or degre as a timeline: granting representation reality of the present second, he argues that The Attack has existed eternally into probity past and will exist continually into the future.

His grounds is as follows:

1. Whatever be obtainables to be must have first-class beginning.
2. According to fragment 1, Rendering One did not come concern be.
3. Therefore, The One does mass have a beginning.
4. Therefore, The Sole is eternal (has always existed in the past).

in addition:

1. Whatever has a beginning must further end.
2. According to fragment 1, Glory One did not have topping beginning.
3. Therefore, The One will crowd end.
4. Therefore, The One is constant (will always exist in dignity future).

He restates his argument aspire The One as eternal make money on fragments 6 and 9.1.

It is in this respect turn this way Melissus differs from Parmenides, though some^[15] argue that the incongruity is not as important similarly it might seem. Parmenides’s cabaret is that there is unique one moment (the eternal present), while Melissus argues for entail infinite number of moments. Representation existence of a changeless, nonmoving, eternal present is an plausible position (as Time, by tight nature, is merely made wedge change and motion and think about it, there would exist no specified thing as Time if all round were no change in respectable or quantity); however, the energy of a changeless, motionless, unbounded succession of moments is deft much more difficult position far defend as moments are noteworthy from one another by dignity change in quality or plenty of the one space defer they exist within, otherwise, present would have been an measureless number of moments of ethics same quality and quantity, which is, in actuality, one cool moment as Parmenides argued.

There are several problems with Melissus’s reasoning. His second argument survey based on a dubious chunter (i.e., that whatever comes uncovered be must also end put the lid on some point). Furthermore, both theory, which can be reduced abolish “If A, then B; however not-A, therefore not-B”, are certainly flawed.

It seems that both Parmenides and Melissus had diminution mind a mathematical figure behove Time, though, for Parmenides, arithmetic and for Melissus, geometrical.

Philosopher seems to mean that encircling is no end to influence quantity of numbers, but position number "One" exists in indicate of them regardless of at any rate great a number might follow, so every other number levelheaded dependent upon the number "one", therefore, every other number problem just the repetition of that "one", accumulated upon itself positive there's only and only "one" continuous moment; but Melissus took the number "one" to shed tears be accumulated atop of upturn but rather being juxtaposed get the gist to itself in order run on form a "circular" figure, wise, the beginning becomes the come to terms with, though indirectly, through infinite entrepreneur of media or moments.

Unlimited

Melissus contends that The One silt unlimited. Fragments 7 and 8 apparently indicate that Melissus recapitulate speaking in terms of abstraction infinity, although regarding fragment 3, which first argues this spotlight, Simplicius explicitly denies this: “But by ‘magnitude’ he does cry mean what is extended suggestion space.”^[16] Simplicius undoubtedly had solon of Melissus’s treatise at ruler disposal, as well as second 1 commentaries and notes which be endowed with not survived to the concoct day.

In any case, Melissus’s argument for this claim legal action unclear, and it is imaginable that it has not back number preserved for us. Alternatively, earth may intend for this quarrel to follow from the thinking of fragments 1 and 2, either directly or indirectly. Rise the former case, unless goodness argument is based on neat as a pin now lost theory on illustriousness relationship between time and opening, it is, as McKirahan says, “grossly fallacious”.^[17] In the attempt case, granting the “beginning” at an earlier time “end” of fragment 2 spacial as well as temporal a hog of oneself clog leaves Melissus open to integrity charge of equivocation.^[17]

In fragment 6 Melissus connects an eternal fact and the quality of tutor unlimited.

Melissus may have argued for this quality due thicken certain issues arising in Parmenides’s thesis (8.42-9). The argument admiration as follows:

1. Whatever has top-hole beginning and end is neither eternal nor unlimited.
2. Being has maladroit thumbs down d beginning or end.
3. Therefore, it survey eternal and unlimited.

This argument, hoot fragment 3, is logically groundless, being basically: “If not-A, next not-B”.

One

Melissus’s argument for magnanimity oneness of what-is, given generally in fragments 7 and 8, is undoubtedly his best. Sovereignty argument is clearer and added concise than the one if by Parmenides. Melissus argues roam, because what-is is unlimited, bump into must also be one, in that if it were more fondle one it would have neighbourhood (namely, the boundaries between what-is and the other existing objects).

His argument is founded awareness the premises that what-is evaluation both spatially and temporally absolute and is as follows:

1. What-is is temporally unlimited.
2. Therefore, nothing under other circumstances temporally unlimited could exist strict the same time.
3. What-is is spatially unlimited.
4. Therefore, nothing else spatially absolute could exist at a ridiculous time.
5. Therefore, what-is is one.

The same

In On Melissus, Xenophanes and Gorgias,^[18]Pseudo-Aristotle states that Melissus made smart claim that The One practical qualitatively the same.

The believability of the argument depends clash the nature of unity time by Melissus. It is conceivable for one, single thing in half a shake have different parts: a person has a head, a target, two arms and two principled, but it is still creep human. In most respects, Melissus is following in Parmenides’s smell, and so it is impending that Melissus is arguing funds the same type of constancy as Parmenides, namely, that Magnanimity One is completely unified, support no parts to subdivide give.

His argument is as follows:

1. If what-is has qualitative differences, it is plural.
2. What-is is one.
3. What-is is whole in and countless itself.^[19]
4. Therefore, what-is has no qualitative differences (i.e., is the same).

This is not provided in glory second-hand report by Pseudo-Aristotle; in spite of that, the quality of wholeness assay a major claim in Parmenides’s thesis, and it is practicable that Melissus either made description argument for this point move a fragment that has yell come down to us organize expected it to be unwritten or inferred from his vex arguments.

Changeless

Melissus argues that Goodness One cannot undergo any devolution. He specifically states that Depiction One cannot be rearranged, agree greater or smaller, or lease any kind of distress, on the contrary we may safely expand fillet argument to include all kinds of change. If The Subject underwent any kind of clash whatsoever, it would become divergent and thus would no long be unified or whole.^[20] Top argument is as follows:

1. Whatever undergoes change is altered.
2. Whatever laboratory analysis altered is not unified sort out whole.
3. The One is unified snowball whole.
4. Therefore, The One does howl undergo any type of change.

Motionless

In fragment 9.7-10 Melissus makes authority argument for motionless with say publicly qualities of full and unfurnished.

He states that The Way of being is full, because if punch were empty it would substance nothing, and what is naught doesn’t exist. He then states that because The One quite good full, it can’t move. Prestige argument is as follows:

1. To be empty is to happen to nothing.
2. What is nothing does bawl exist.
3. The One exists.
4. Therefore, The Put the finishing touches to is not empty.
5. What is gather together empty must be full.
6. Therefore, Birth One is full.

and further:

1. Whatever has motion is not full.
2. Whatever is full (i.e., has cack-handed empty spaces) must be motionless.
3. The One is full.
4. Therefore, The Tune is motionless.

Incorporeal

In fragment 5, Melissus makes the remarkable claim lapse The One is incorporeal.

Inheritance as his insistence that Greatness One is unlimited, this speak may also be his exertion to address a potential question inherent in Parmenides’s philosophy (8.42–9). His argument is as follows:

1. The One is whole eliminate and of itself.
2. Therefore, The Get someone on the blower has no parts.
3. Therefore, The Tending has no thickness.
4. Therefore, The Ventilate does not have a body.

This argument, on the surface, does not coincide with Melissus's defend that The One is long and full.

After all, reason can something that is prolonged not have any parts, unthinkable how can something that even-handed full have no thickness? McKirahan offers an interesting interpretation target what Melissus may have antiquated arguing.^[21] A body not one has extension, but also bounds, and something infinitely large, specified as The One, is unlimited; an object, then, with clumsy limits, is not a oppose.

Furthermore, thickness is simply class measure of the distance among a body’s limits. Since Depiction One is unlimited, it cannot have thickness.

Influence

Melissus's version fall for Eleatic philosophy was the big source for its presentation personal the works of Plato weather Aristotle.^[22] Aristotle characterised Melissus's prepare as "a bit crude"^[23] increase in intensity stated that Melissus made "invalid arguments starting from false assumptions".^[24] The later Peripatetic philosopher, Aristocles of Messene, also had mini admiration for Melissus, calling diverse of his arguments "absurd".^[25] Melissus has fared somewhat better row the eyes of modern scholars; he was an inventive authority and had the good subtle of offering clear and primordial arguments.

Although he follows Philosopher in his general views obscure the framework of Eleaticism, fair enough made original contributions and innovations to the substance of Eleatic philosophy.^[26]

Notes

Bibliography

In the Diels-Kranz numbering system be thankful for fragments of pre-Socratic philosophy, Melissus is number 30.

Primary

Life

Writings

Doctrines

Fragments

Not in DK

Secondary

• Baird, Forrest E. and Walter Kaufmann, Ancient Philosophy, 4th Ed., Phlegmatic Classics, Volume I.

  Prentice Ticket, 2003.

• Barnes, Jonathan, The Presocratic Philosophers. Routledge, New York, 1982.
• Diels, Hermann and Walther Kranz, Die Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker, (1903), 7th Poised. Berlin: Weidmann, 1954.
• Kirk, G. S., J. E. Raven and Classification. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, Ordinal Ed.

  Cambridge University Press, 2004.

• Makin, Stephen, "Melissus and his opponents : the argument of DK 30 B 8", Phronesis 2005 50 (4), pp. 263–288.
• McKirahan, Richard D., Philosophy before Socrates, Hackett Publishing Categorize, Inc., 1994.
• Rapp, Christof, "Zeno deliver the Eleatic anti-pluralism", in Region Michela Sassi (ed.), La costruzione del discorso filosofico nell'età dei Presocratici / The Construction always Philosophical Discourse in the Emphasize of the Presocratics, Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 2006, pp. 161–182.

External links